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Abstract. The construction of tradition in the military depends on the 
meaning given to certain aspects of the past in the light of the pres-
ent. West Germany’s history of tradition-building since 1955 is a case 
in point. After the end of Nazism, the new democratic armed forces, 
the Bundeswehr, was supposed to distance itself from the Wehrmacht 
by emphasizing the “civil” role of soldiers. Communicating historical 
knowledge became part of their democratic education rather than a 
guideline for military performance. Institutions such as the Center for 
Military History and the Museum of Military History, travel exhibitions, 
as well as popular scientific journals have contributed to an understand-
ing of what is worthy of tradition – in particular the Prussian reforms, 
the plot of 20 July 1944, and the history of the Bundeswehr itself. Such 
references to the past – so the argument goes – help soldiers in combat 
to better grasp the ethical framework of military operations, provide 
orientation, and support their identity. Whether and how traditions 
should be adjusted according to changing military conditions remains 
controversial.
Any reference to the past gives evidence of the present. Starting from 
this assumption, I will reflect on the German concept of linking military 
history to historical education and the construction of tradition in the 
military. This has not only been an academic issue, but also a very salient 
political problem. The importance of historical knowledge in the German 
armed forces is reflected by the public debate that led, in March 2018, 
to new guidelines by the Minister of Defence. Its starting point was a 
 startling scandal. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.22601/SAA.2019.08.06
172 Jörg Echternkamp
“We can tolerate many things, but not political extremism, right-wing 
or religiously motivated extremism,” Minister Ursula von der Leyen told 
the media in May 2017.1 She was reacting to the strange case of a 28-year-
old army lieutenant who led what prosecutors called a “double life”, pre-
tending to be a Syrian refugee. He was arrested on suspicion of planning a 
gun attack which he meant to blame on his alter ego – a fictitious Damas-
cus fruit seller. The scandal widened after media reported the suspect had 
expressed far-right views in his 2014 master thesis, but that no disciplin-
ary action was taken against him. As a result of this scandal, all barracks 
buildings were searched for objects, images, symbols referring to Hitler’s 
German Army, the Wehrmacht.2 German soldiers are supposed to cherish 
tradition, but the military instrument of Nazi dictatorship is not part of 
this. This leads to the central question in the context of this conference: 
“Which Past for the Soldier?”. The subtitle deliberately points up three 
aspects: “Military history, historical education, and the ethics of democ-
racy”. I will argue that these three elements have been – and will be – 
inextricably linked when it comes to the use of the past in the German 
Armed Forces.
Discontinuity and “Innere Führung”
In Germany, military history is primarily marked by discontinuity. The 
coexistence of two German armies opposing each other until the break-
down of East Germany in 1989–1990 is a more recent case in point. Not 
surprisingly, West German soldiers generally do not value its former com-
munist counterpart.3 The history of the National People’s Army (NVA) 
1 Verteidigungsministerium zum Fall Franco A.: “Bundeswehr hat ein Haltungsproblem,” 
Der Tagesspiegel, 30.04.2017.
2 For the chronology of the case see the wikipedia article “Terror Ermittlungen gegen Bun-
deswehr Soldaten 2017,” https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorermittlungen_gegen_Bun-
deswehrsoldaten_2017, accessed 1.12.2018.
3 Nina Leonhard, “‘Armee der Einheit’: Zur Integration von NVA-Soldaten in die Bun-
deswehr,” – Handbuch Militär und Sozialwissenschaft, ed. Sven B. Gareis and Paul Klein, 2. 
Aufl. (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), 61–71; Ibid., Integration und 
Gedächtnis. NVA-Offiziere im vereinigten Deutschland (Konstanz: UVK-Verlag, 2016).
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that goes back 35 years is not a part of today’s military tradition.4 Things 
become much trickier, however, when it comes to the pre-1945 past. Ever 
since rearmament in the mid-1950s, references to the years when Ger-
man soldiers were actually fighting has been problematic because of the 
history of the Nazi regime and its armed forces, the Wehrmacht.5 The 
West German armed forces (Bundeswehr), established in 1955–1956 in 
a democratic state, could and should not simply be considered a remake 
of Hitler’s army. Paradoxically, the Wehrmacht was not the forerunner 
of its follower. After all, “demilitarizing” the Germans had been a major 
goal of the Allies’ occupation policy in the immediate post-war period. 
Using military force without issue has ceased to a given. This can be seen 
in the mass protests against rearmament in the 1950s as well as in the 
opposition to foreign missions among the majority of Germans in the last 
decades.
Certainly, the new “democratic” army had to be legitimized by a new 
culture of leadership. This principle has been called Innere Führung.6 It 
tries to harmonize the values of democracy and the requirements of a 
military organization in order to motivate the soldiers and by doing so 
strengthen its efficiency. “Internal leadership” – as opposed to formal, 
external leadership – links all military values explicitly to the values and 
4 Rüdiger Wenzke, Nationale Volksarmee. Die Geschichte (München: Bucher, 2014); Ibid., 
Ulbrichts Soldaten. Die Nationale Volksarmee 1956 bis 1971. Militärgeschichte der DDR 22 
(Berlin: Ch. Links, 2013).
5 For a synthesis of research on Wehrmacht see Jürgen Förster, Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat. 
Eine strukturgeschichtliche Analyse (München: Oldenbourg, 2007); Wolfram Wette, Die Wehr-
macht. Feindbilder, Vernichtungskrieg, Legenden (Frankfurt am Main: C. H. Beck, 2005). On 
the debate see Christian Hartmann, Johannes Hürter, Ulrike Jureit, eds., Verbrechen der Wehr-
macht: Bilanz einer Debatte (München: Beck, 2005). On the role of German veterans see Jörg 
Echternkamp, Soldaten im Nachkrieg. Historische Deutungskonflikte und westdeutsche Demo-
kratisierung 1945–1955. Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte 76 (München: DeGruyter/Oldenbourg, 
2014).
6 Frank Nägler, Der gewollte Soldat und sein Wandel. Personelle Rüstung und Innere Führung 
in den Aufbaujahren der Bundeswehr 1956 bis 1964/65. Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräfte der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 9 (München: DeGruyter/Oldenbourg, 2011); Georg Meyer, “Zur 
Inneren Entwicklung der Bundeswehr bis 1960/61,” – Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspoli-
tik 1945–1956, Bd. 3: Die Nato-Option, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (München: 
Oldenbourg, 1993), 851–1162. See Zentrale Dienstvorschrift A-2600/1 “Innere Führung. 
Selbstverständnis und Führungskultur”, 6.11.2017, www.bmvg.de, accessed 14.01.2020.
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norms of the German Constitution, particularly to liberty, democracy, 
and the rule of law. Therefore, in 1956, a school for advanced training was 
founded, since 1981 named “Centre for Innere Führung”.7 At the core of 
this culture is the role model of the “citizen in uniform” (Staatsbürger in 
Uniform). The concept is based on the idea of an army in the midst of civil 
society. It is based on the ideal of officers who get politically involved – 
not on behalf of one single party (as had been the case in the GDR), but 
in support of a system of political pluralism.8 The concept assumes that 
soldiers are able to decide themselves, by the dictates of their conscience, 
whether or not an order is in accordance with the Constitution. There is 
no absolute obedience in the German Army. 
However, well into the 1970s this new culture of leadership met with 
resistance from parts of the Bundeswehr due to the prevalence of so-called 
traditionalists who were affected by the culture of the Wehrmacht. It was 
not until the mid-1960s that the concept of Innere Führung was debated 
inside the Army as well as by the German public. While the traditional-
ists argued that being a soldier is a profession sui generis and grounded in 
“eternal” military values such as comradeship, reformers insisted on the 
ideal of a Bundeswehr based on the values of democracy and pluralism. 
In recent years, against the new backdrop of missions abroad, critics have 
called for a role model for military professionals that is presumably closer 
to combat reality. The advocates of Innere Führung, however, underline 
the fact that finally the concept has been successfully tested. A key com-
ponent of this concept, however, is historical education. 
7 Hans-Joachim Reeb and Peter Többicke, Lexikon Innere Führung (Regensburg: Walhalla, 
4. Aufl., 2014); Hans-Joachim Reeb, “60 Jahre Innere Führung: das Wesensmerkmal der Bun-
deswehr im Lauf der Geschichte,” Zeitschrift für die Innere Führung: if 59 (2015), Heft 4: 23–30.
8 See from a comparative perspective Jörg Echternkamp, “Der politische Offizier als norma-
tiver Typus. Zum Verhältnis von Politik und Militär im ‘Dritten Reich’, in der DDR und der 
Bundesrepublik,” Tel Aviv Yearbook for German History (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2016), 221–250.
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The role of historical education
If a soldier’s conscience is so important, it is equally important to train 
the soldier in a way that his value system reflects the ethics of democracy.9 
This has been the fundamental goal of historical and political education 
in the Federal Republic.10 One needs historical knowledge if one wants to 
behave as a citizen. One needs to understand how the values of the legal 
system have developed and where they originated historically. Also, sol-
diers have to learn about the past in order to recognize which historical 
events, persons and institutions would be suitable or unsuitable for their 
“tradition”. The main idea is based on the distinction between education 
and training, between Bildung and Ausbildung. Debating the past pro-
vides a more general education (Bildung) than precise guidelines for mili-
tary behaviour. Historical education conveys knowledge on the cause and 
effect of former developments. It explains the development of political, 
cultural, and military problems of the present. The intention of histori-
cal education in this context is a military one. It is historical knowledge 
that enables the soldiers to critically discuss their tradition, their job as 
soldiers, as well as their self-image as “citizens in uniform”. What is more, 
knowing about the past, especially the Nazi past and the war of annihila-
tion, helps the soldier to identify with the free and democratic order of 
the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Thus, studying and teaching military history in the Bundeswehr is 
not merely a useful pursuit during time not taken up by military train-
ing. History is essential for the self-understanding of the Army. To be 
more precise, the adequate understanding of history is essential. Keeping 
in mind the personal continuity – former Wehrmacht soldiers serving 
in the West German Army well into the 1970s – it is evident that what 
9 Klaus Ebeling, Militär und Ethik: Moral- und militärkritische Reflexionen zum Selbstver-
ständnis der Bundeswehr, Beiträge zur Friedensethik 41 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2006).
10 For the history of political education see Gerrit Mambour, Zwischen Politik und Pädagogik – 
Eine politische Geschichte der politischen Bildung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Schwal-
bach/Ts., 2007). The current understanding of political education in the German Armed Forces 
is reflected by the Bundeswehr’s Zentrale Dienstvorschrift A-2620/1 (Regulation) “Politische 
Bildung in der Bundeswehr”, www.bmvg.de, accessed 5.11.2018.
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was clear in theory did not always work out in practice. Time and again, 
the military cherished their brave and loyal comrades who presumably 
did a good job in World War II. So, why not, for instance, name bar-
racks after famous Wehrmacht generals? The Ministry of Defence tried 
to counter those tendencies and respond to voices of public protest that 
grew louder in the 1980s and the 1990s. Two “tradition decrees”, issued 
by the Ministers of Defence in 1965 and 1982 respectively, were meant 
to make sure that any reference to the past in the barracks – from lecture 
halls and monuments to the naming of buildings – was in line with the 
political values.11 Since the mid-1990s, the German Army has reviewed 
the naming and abandoned various names. The former Dietl-Kaserne of 
the mountain infantry in the Bavarian town of Füssen is a case in point. 
Those barracks had been given the name of Wehrmacht Colonel Gen-
eral Eduard Dietl, whom Adolf Hitler himself had called a “true friend”. 
Due to Dietl’s role during the Nazi regime and against the backdrop of a 
critical public debate,12 Minister of Defence Volker Rühe decided in 1995 
to rename the barracks “Allgäu-Kaserne,” the new name referring to the 
Bavarian region of Allgäu.
Communicating historical knowledge
Who is in charge of historical education? Where does historical knowl-
edge come from? How is it communicated to the soldiers? The Centre for 
Innere Führung, the key institution of political-historical education has 
already been mentioned. In a narrower sense, it is the Bundeswehr Center 
for Military History and Social Sciences (ZMSBw) at Potsdam that has 
11 See Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross. The search for tradition in the West German 
armed forces (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
12 See e.g. the article “Des Führers General. Darf eine Kaserne den Namen des Wehrmacht-
Offiziers und Hitler-Freundes Dietl tragen?”, Der Spiegel, 24.05.1993, http://www.spiegel.de/
spiegel/print/d-13681952.html, accessed 20.12.2018. Hans-Hubertus Mack, “Vorbilder? Die 
Diskussion um die Namensgeber für Bundeswehr-Kasernen,” Militärgeschichte Zeitschrift für 
historische Bildung 4 (2014): 18–21; Loretana de Libero, Tradition in Zeiten der Transformation. 
Zum Traditionsverständnis der Bundeswehr im frühen 21. Jahrhundert (Paderborn: Schöningh, 
2006).
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been in charge in two ways. On the one hand, it is in this institute, founded 
in the late 1950s under the name Das Militärgeschichtliche Forschungsamt 
(MGFA), that historians do research in military history.13 The research-
ers are supposed to be part of the academic community to guarantee the 
scientific respectability of their work. On the other hand, the Center’s 
department of historical education makes use of their colleagues’ books 
and articles, prepares the results didactically, and makes them available to 
the army. Various forms of communication have developed over the last 
decades. To begin with, at each school of officers and non-commissioned 
officers (for the army, air force, navy), there are teachers of military his-
tory. Secondly, almost every unit has at its disposal a collection of objects 
referring to military history, a collection in line with the rules set by the 
ZMSBw. Thirdly, travelling exhibitions illustrate and interpret impor-
tant chapters of German military history. Since the 1980s the Center for 
Military History has organized travelling exhibitions, most notably an 
exhibition on resistance within the armed forces against Hitler.14 It ran 
parallel for a while with the travelling exhibition “War of Annihilation. 
The Crimes of the Wehrmacht” (Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Weh-
rmacht) produced by the Hamburg Institute for Social Research, initiat-
ing a fierce debate on the role of the Wehrmacht. A more recent exam-
ple is the poster exhibition on the sometimes controversial relationship 
between military and society in both East and West Germany, presenting 
the two opposing German armies, their social and political roles, as well 
as their transformation into one army (Armee der Einheit) in the 1990s.
Fourthly, military history is on display in the German Army’s muse-
ums. The most recent one to be established, some say the most spec-
13 For the history of the institutionalization of military history in West Germany see Martin 
Rink, 50 Jahre Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt. Eine Chronik, ed. Militärgeschichtliches 
Forschungsamt (Berlin: be.bra verlag 2007); Jörg Echternkamp, „Auftrag: Forschung. Die 
Bundeswehr, das Verteidigungsministerium und die Aufarbeitung der NS-Vergangenheit im 
Systemkonflikt“, in: Zeitgeschichte-online, Juni 2015, https://zeitgeschichte-online.de/thema/
auftrag-forschung, 3.11.2018; Dietl und kein Ende, in: Diez Zeit, 3.11.1995, https://www.zeit.
de/1995/45/Dietl_und_kein_Ende_Er_war_Nationalsozialist_der, accessed 3.11.2018.
14 Cf. Thomas Vogel, ed., Aufstand des Gewissens – Militärischer Widerstand gegen Hitler und 
das NS-Regime 1933–1945 (Hamburg: Mittler, 5. Aufl. 2000). A more recent example is the 
exhibition on military and society “Militär und Gesellschaft in Deutschland since 1945”.
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tacular of German museums, is run by the Army – the Military History 
Museum (Militärhistorisches Museum, MHM) at Dresden. It is not a dis-
play of weapons and military power, as some visitors might have hoped. 
Rather, it confronts the museum-goers with the violent past, especially 
of the two world wars. It also collects objects from more recent military 
missions, such as a “Wolf ” Jeep damaged in 2004 by an attack in Afghani-
stan wounding three Bundeswehr soldiers. A branch of the MHM, the 
air force museum at Berlin-Gatow, is under construction. The MHM is 
an example of how social and cultural approaches of historiography can 
form museological concepts. Historical knowledge is also – and this is the 
fifth point – spread by print media, e.g. the quarterly magazine Militär-
geschichte. Zeitschrift für historische Bildung (Military History. Journal 
for historical education), edited by the Potsdam Centre. Also, there are 
brochures on topics considered particularly relevant, such as the attack 
on Hitler 20 July 1944. The journal as well as the brochures are also avail-
able online. Finally, the Bundeswehr is capitalizing on the so-called new 
media. The Centre for Innere Führung is currently working on an online 
platform which provides all kinds of information on military history, 
including a selection of people and events of the past that could become 
officially part of a military unit’s “tradition”.
Teaching, collections, travelling exhibitions, museums, print and 
digital media: these are the different ways to impart historical knowledge 
that is considered necessary for the soldier to be a “citizen in uniform”. 
This brings us back to the more analytical question of “Which past for 
the soldier?”
A political minefield: “military tradition”
It is now clear that the Nazi regime and its military cannot lay the his-
torical groundwork for the German Army. But what are the aspects of 
the past that soldiers can and should refer to in a positive way? Since 
its establishment in the mid-1950s, the West German army has referred 
most of all to three lines of tradition: the Prussian reforms of the early 19th 
century, the resistance by civilians and officers against Hitler during the 
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Third Reich, as well as its own past, the history of the Bundeswehr itself. 
Let me outline these three answers to the question “Which past for the 
soldier?”
First of all, the so-called Prussian Reforms had changed the military 
system in the German countries in a radical way. Defeated by Napo-
leon’s army in 1806, generals and top-ranking officials such as Gerhard 
von Scharnhorst, August Neidhardt von Gneisenau and Hermann von 
Boyen reorganized Prussia’s government, administration, and military 
based on Enlightenment ideas and in line with reforms in other European 
nations. Most notably from a military perspective, they adopted the con-
cept of conscription. Every citizen who enjoys his rights, the argument 
went, should be ready to defend those rights. Citizens were turned into 
soldiers: this idea matches the key concept of today’s Innere Führung. 
Small wonder that the reformers are regarded as the forerunners of con-
scription.15 Thus, it was on Scharnhorst’s 200th birth anniversary that the 
first Bundeswehr soldiers were sworn in. The Iron Cross, a decoration 
endowed at the time, has been the symbol of the West German Armed 
Forces ever since (including, however, the years 1933–1945). Reference 
to the past is always ambivalent, because it is not the past but its inter-
pretation that counts. The Prussian Reform era is a case in point. Not 
only West Germany, but also communist East Germany made use of this 
national tradition, naming, for instance, the highest military decoration 
after Scharnhorst. The idea was similar: to turning the military into a 
national army as opposed to an instrument of capitalist oppression.
Secondly, the second answer to the central question “Which past for 
the soldier?” has referred to military resistance against National Social-
ism, most of all the 20 July plot. On 20 July 1944, Claus von Stauffenberg 
and other conspirators attempted to assassinate Hitler inside his head-
quarters in East Prussia. The apparent aim of the assassination attempt 
was to wrest political control of Germany and its armed forces from the 
Nazi Party, to make peace with the western Allies as soon as possible, 
and to spare the German people further violence. However, the underly-
15 For an early interpretation cf. Hans-Joachim Harder and Norbert Wiggershaus, Tradition 
und Reform in den Aufbaujahren der Bundeswehr (Herford: Mittler, 1985).
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ing desire of many of the high-ranking Wehrmacht officers involved was 
to show the world that not all Germans were Nazis. In other words, the 
resistance fighters represent what has been called “the other Germany”. 
In terms of tradition building, this intention counts more than the failed 
attack. Most of all, the plot is the prime historical example of soldiers 
placing a higher value on their conscience than on the principle of uncon-
ditional obedience. As mentioned above, this idea has been fundamental 
to the West German Army’s self-conception.
There is a third answer that has become more relevant over the years. 
The West German Army is supposed to turn to its “own” past for tradi-
tion building. At first glance this seems to be easy. Contrary to pre-1945 
military history, there is no contradiction between the positive tradition 
of the Army and the political system it served. But of course, not every 
aspect of its own history is exemplary. Again, it is important to decide 
which events, developments, and people lend themselves to be cherished 
as “good” German tradition. This focus on Bundeswehr military history 
is inextricably linked to the problem of how to commemorate the death 
of fallen soldiers. Monuments and places that were used to remember 
those “comrades” who died during the Second (and First) World War 
were also used with regard to those who gave their lives for the army 
of a democratic state. After controversial public and academic debates,16 
the Bundeswehr erected its own monument, the “Ehrenmal” in Berlin, in 
2009. Its inscription reads: “To the Dead of Our Bundeswehr – for Peace, 
Justice, and Freedom (Den Toten unserer Bundeswehr für Frieden, Recht 
und Freiheit). Contrary to conventional forms of commemoration, the 
transience and individuality of life are underlined by alternating video 
projections of the more than 3,200 names. Thus, when it comes to com-
memoration, the past of the democratic Bundeswehr has been separated 
by form and content from the times of dictatorship and the Wehrmacht.
16 Manfred Hettling and Jörg Echternkamp, Bedingt erinnerungsbereit. Soldatengedenken in 
der Berliner Republik (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008).
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Which past for the soldier?  
New guidelines for the future of the past 
Most recently, the post-1945/1955 past has become the central point of 
reference for tradition in the German Army. Due to the public debate 
caused by the scandals in 2017, the Minister of Defence has issued new 
guidelines.17 This third “decree of tradition” in West German history is 
the result of four workshops where soldiers of all ranks, veterans, histo-
rians, sociologists, political scientists and a broader audience discussed 
basically every aspect of the problem. For many participants, it was clear 
that the army needed historical examples for orientation. Less clear, how-
ever, was historical orientation itself. Again, the question was “Which 
past for the soldier?”
The new guidelines underline three principles that will be relevant for 
the future. First, the function of tradition and historical education is its 
impact on the present – identity, legitimacy, efficiency are the keywords. 
Secondly, every reference to the past is indissolubly connected to the val-
ues of the Constitution (as opposed to the values of the time and to so-
called time-less values). In short, bravery is not enough unless it helped 
the cause of freedom and democracy. Thirdly, the guidelines substantiate 
those elements of the Bundeswehr’s past that are suitable for tradition 
building. Let me give some examples: the German Army’s contribution to 
international crisis management, their involvement in international mis-
sions as seen as a proof of value; the merits of around 8 million conscripts 
(until 2011); the “founding fathers” Wolf Graf von Baudissin, Ulrich de 
Maizière und Johann Adolf Graf von Kielmansegg (despite their career in 
the Wehrmacht); the integration into multinational structures from the 
very beginning; the role in the NATO strategy of forward defence dur-
ing the Cold War; emergency relief in areas of humanitarian catastrophe; 
the successful integration of former East German soldiers into the West 
German Army after 1989–1990. Commemorating the 2,500 Bundeswehr 
17 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: “Die Tradition der Bundeswehr. Richtlinien zum 




members who died while on duty up to 1989–1990 will also be a part 
of dealing with the past. Finally, there is the concept of leadership itself 
and its ideal of the “citizen in uniform”. It is striking that these elements 
are not restricted to the soldiers. They also include civilian employees 
of the armed forces. This is an interpretation along the lines of the Ber-
lin “Ehrenmal” where commemoration includes soldiers and civilians 
alike – contrary to traditional monuments.
Conclusion
As the German case neatly shows, the past can and should be a soldier’s 
guide for the present – this dovetails with the theme of the Yearbook. It 
can be a guide in three regards. First of all, in democratic states, mili-
tary “tradition” (i.e. the repertory of mostly exemplary elements of the 
past) is inextricably linked to the ethical principles and political values 
stipulated in the Constitution. Democratic societies want their soldiers 
to take heed of human rights. Historical knowledge is a crucial tool for 
a better understanding of the ethical framework of military operations. 
Secondly, soldiers in combat have to be able to react not just instinctively 
but also on the grounds of rational reflection. This holds all the more true 
in the German case of mission-type tactics (Auftragstaktik) empowering 
subordinates at all levels. The past gives no clear-cut instructions to be 
carried out. However, it does provide orientation in a military context 
where soldiers need guidance from lasting historical models to adapt 
their  behaviour to quickly changing situations in various cultural con-
texts and in a time where the security architecture has become scattered. 
Third, knowledge of military history supports the soldier’s identity, 
helping to legitimize the military operation and therefore providing the 
necessary morale. Thus, the importance of military history in military 
pedagogy can hardly be overestimated. This is the leitmotif of the current 
debate in Germany. The crucial question, however, remains: “Which past 
for the German soldier?” For instance, combat experience in out-of-area 
missions since the late 1990s have raised the question of whether or not 
one should refer to the experience of Wehrmacht soldiers. In the light of 
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growing tensions in Eastern Europe, referring to the past of World War II 
might seem all the more obvious – but should one take Hitler’s soldiers as 
role models for the German army today?
Methodologically speaking, to compare internationally the impor-
tance of history in military education is the logical consequence of the 
multinational character of current and future missions. The German 
example could also make a valuable contribution to the discussion of 
what I would call historical knowledge transfer in soldiers’ education – 
broadening the military profession’s perspective by pointing to European 
dimensions of military history.18
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